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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
In 1968 Friedman put forward the notion of a “natural” rate of unemployment to
encapsulate the idea that a “normal” level of unemployment, roughly equivalent to the
amount of frictional and structural unemployment, persists even when the labour
market is in equilibrium. Since there are no direct measures of the natural rate, as it is
essentially a theoretical construct, one must be satisfied with proxy estimates derived
using various methods including that which draws on Tobin’s concept of the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (i.e. the NAIRU).
The concept of the NAIRU should be seen in the context of the shift in the framework
for analysis of the labour market over the last number of decades from one focussed
on whether the labour market clears or not, to one which allows for imperfectly
competitive goods markets and recognises that unions have a role to play in terms of
wage determination. This shift to a bargaining framework of wage setting under
imperfect competition is likely to lead to a NAIRU estimate which converges to an
unemployment rate which is higher, because of the monopolistic element, compared
with that under the classical competitive paradigm and its theoretically equivalent
concept of the natural rate.
The essential objective of the present paper is to produce statistically significant and
economically reasonable, time-varying, NAIRU estimates (TV-NAIRU's) for the
Community's Member States which also have informational content in terms of
inflation. While it is clearly difficult to estimate NAIRU's using variables to cover all
the main contributory factors which are likely to be at play, it may nevertheless be
possible to isolate the principal "sinners" by selecting a modelling strategy which is
both theoretically robust and empirically respectful of a number of key pre-
determined criteria, including in particular the inflation tracking performance of the
estimated NAIRU's / unemployment gaps.
The TV-NAIRU approach attempts to provide an indication of the path the NAIRU
has taken over a particular period, by including variables which capture the impact of
significant supply side shocks, over the period in question, which would have been
expected to influence the NAIRU. Examples of the latter over the last number of
decades include the slowdown in trend productivity growth, the large external oil
price shocks and the presumed deterioration, especially in Europe, in labour market
flexibility. One can introduce this « time varying » element by using either a
statistical model to determine the NAIRU, which allows the NAIRU to vary but
ensures that this variation is smooth over time (eg Cubic Spline / Kalman Filter
approaches) or an economic model approach which uses additional economic
variables which capture the supply side shocks, mentioned above, to identify the
NAIRU. The latter economic model approach is used in the present study for the
period 1980-1999, with the introduction of variables like productivity, the real interest
rate, the tax burden and replacement ratios etc having the effect of producing a « time-
varying » NAIRU, which shifts over time due to changes in the respective
determining variables.5
It should be stressed at the outset that precise measurements of the TV-NAIRU are
extremely difficult to produce because any measurement process is dogged by the
existence of two fundamental sources of uncertainty. The first source of uncertainty
emanates from the fact that the NAIRU must be estimated since it is unobserved, with
many different modelling approaches and empirical specifications from which to
choose, all of which give plausible, although different, point measurements of the
NAIRU. The second source of uncertainty is the degree of doubt surrounding the
NAIRU point estimates themselves, which are imprecisely calculated from a
combination of stochastic variables and parameters, with the computing of confidence
intervals for the latter highlighting the extent of the imprecision of the various
methods used in the calculation. Given these latter uncertainties, it is hardly
surprising to find that the NAIRU is increasingly been seen not as a robust point
estimate but as a zone.
In overall terms, the methodology developed in this paper is not that different to that
adopted by the OECD to produce its NAWRU series since both this paper and the
OECD use a method which in essence assumes that the change in wage/price inflation
is proportional to the unemployment gap i.e. the gap between the actual
unemployment rate and the calculated NAIRU/NAWRU series. However, while the
methodology adopted has similarities with the OECD's approach, there are some
notable differences including in particular the inclusion of a number of structural
variables such as real interest rates etc which try to give some indication of the
sources of the change in the "reduced form" NAIRU over time. Furthermore, unlike
the OECD methodology, the approach adopted in this paper uses standard estimation
methods which allows for the computation of confidence intervals as well as
permitting the statistical and economic significance of the preferred explanatory
variables to be checked and validated. Only those structural variables which are
statistically significant and have economically the expected coefficient sign are used
in the final model.
The paper is structured as follows. In section one, following a short overview of the
main NAIRU modelling methods, the details of the preferred modelling strategy
which the paper intends to use to estimate TV-NAIRU's is presented, including the
selection of appropriate variables to cover the main shocks, which occurred over the
period since 1980, such as the productivity slowdown and real interest rate increases,
as well as proxy variables to reflect the impact of institutional rigidities on reservation
wage developments (i.e. taxation and replacement ratio variables). Section two goes
on to give the results of the estimation process, with an important role found for the
taxation and real interest rate variables in a majority of the Community's countries.
Finally, section three tests the NAIRU results in terms of their ability to explain past
movements in wage inflation and also in terms of their usefulness in output gap
models of price inflation.6
SECTION 1 : NAIRU / NAWRU MODELLINGSTRATEGY :A
THEORETICALOVERVIEW
1.1 NAIRU MODELLING METHODS : There are two broad modelling
approaches normally adopted in defining the NAIRU, firstly the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve approach, which distinguishes a series of labour market
variables as potential empirical determinants of the NAIRU, and secondly a number
of statistical methods in which the time series properties of the macroeconomic
variable(s) in question are used to identify the NAIRU. In general, the structural
approach to estimating the NAIRU seems preferable since it allows for a better
economic interpretation of the results. We find in this study that the structural
approach works reasonably well for all EU countries, except Italy where it proved
difficult to find an equilibrium unemployment rate with the chosen structural
indicators.
The calculation of the equilibrium or steady-state (i.e. stable inflation) value of
unemployment from an expectations-augmented Phillips curve framework constitutes
a genuine estimate of the NAIRU given that the Phillips curve postulates a formal
relationship between the unemployment rate and wage/price inflation. As regards this
approach, the NAIRU is established at the point where a stable relationship exists
between the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU and unexpected inflation.
Within this dominant Phillips curve framework two variants have emerged, namely
the single equation inflation approach, an example being Gordon’s “Triangle” model
(see Gordon 1997), with the latter postulating that the inflation rate depends on a
“triangle” of basic factors, namely expected inflation, demand conditions, as proxied
by the unemployment gap, and supply side shocks, and the multiple equation wage-
price model approach (e.g. the bargaining model)1.
1 BROAD THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDERLYING THE BARGAINING “WAGE-PRICE”M ODEL
APPROACH: Wage-Price models can be set up in a wide variety of ways to reflect the international
differences between the labour and product market systems of individual countries. One widely used
wage-price model draws on the bargaining framework of wage determination. This latter bargaining
view of the world interprets real wage developments as being the result of a bargaining process
between employers and employees, the outcome of which reflects the relative degree of market power
possessed by the actors involved. Workers bargaining power, for example, is negatively related to the
prevailing rate of unemployment and positively influenced by factors which tend to push up real wage
demands such as generous social welfare benefits, mismatch problems in the labour market and
unionisation rates. Under this approach real wages are the outcome of a negotiated compromise
between the respective parties with employees, basing their nominal wage demands on aspirations
regarding a target real wage, and employers responding with views as to the feasible or warranted real
wage. Bargaining models of wage determination suggest a process of wage bargaining closer to a
bilateral monopoly than to perfect competition. This approach, commonly referred to in the literature as
“the battle of the mark-ups”, is associated with the work of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and is
often purported to be the most appropriate one to be adopted in the European context.7
1.2 DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED NAIRU MODELLING STRATEGY : The
modelling approach used in the present paper represents essentially a “hybrid” form
of both Gordon’s triangle model and of the bargaining framework underlying the
labour market specification of the Commission Services Quest II model, where wage
rules are postulated, which identify productivity, reservation wage/participation rate
changes and labour market tightness as major determinants of workers wage claims.
Wages in Quest II are in fact determined as a weighted average of the reservation
wage ( unemployment benefits)2 and labour productivity plus an additional mark-up
term that depends on labour market conditions. In this framework unemployment can
be explained in terms of structural characteristics of the labour market, such as
adjustment costs for labour, the replacement rate, the bargaining strength of trade
unions and tax rates.
LABOUR MARKET MACRO MODEL: In more specific terms, the structural
unemployment estimates presented in this note use a simple macro model of the
labour market which consists of a wage equation and a labour demand equation. The
structural unemployment rate defined in this way would be the equilibrium of that
system after wages and prices have adjusted.
Wage Equation: Given the fact that market clearing is an unrealistic description of
European labour markets, which are characterised by substantial involuntary
unemployment, the wage equation does not therefore rely on such a framework. It is
assumed instead that wages are set in an imperfectly competitive fashion. It should be
noted therefore that since the wage rule reflects wage setting in an imperfect market
(e.g. union power, vacancy costs, search costs and efficiency wage considerations) the
equilibrium reached in the labour market will generally be an equilibrium with
involuntary unemployment. Standard macroeconomic models of the labour market
(search-, union bargaining- and efficiency wage models) imply the following
specification for the wage rule:
(1) W/P=w(rew(tl,ben),LUR,MPL)
Workers (trade unions) aim for a real wage (W/P) that depends, as mentioned earlier,
on a reservation wage (rew), labour market tightness (LUR) and the marginal product
of labour (MPL)3. In particular workers will require that (net) wages are set equal to
or above the reservation wage.4 Therefore unemployment benefits (ben) and labour
taxes (tl) can have an effect on the level of wages demanded by workers.
2 A replacement ratio effect which impacts on the consumption/leisure choice.
3 In some specifications, the wage equation is formulated in terms of the average product of labour
instead of the marginal product. These differences do, however, not affect the basic results.
4 From a theoretical point of view an ideal indicator would be the net replacement ratio. Unfortunately,
benefits are not available over a sufficiently long period of time and obtaining a simple empirical
measure for the replacement ratio is difficult since one must capture the effects of both benefit duration
and coverage. Therefore we make the simplifying assumption that movement of tax rates reflect
changes in the net replacement ratio. This is a reasonable approximation if the reservation wage is not
taxed and follows labour productivity.8
Labour Demand Equation: Labour demand is derived from the marginal product
condition which determines the level of real wages the firm is willing to pay for a
given capital intensity (K/L) and level of technology, as represented by total factor
productivity (tfp). Real wages which are offered by the firm depend positively on
capital intensity (which depends negatively on the real interest rate (r) and corporate
taxes (tc)) and on total factor productivity.
(2) W/P=MPL(K/L( r,tc ),tfp)
This condition can also be written as a price equation and can be presented as follows:
(2’) P=P(W,r,tc,tfp)
GENERATING STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES: Labour demand
and labour supply then determine the equilibrium unemployment rate (LUR*) as a
function of the interest rate, labour and capital taxes (henceforth denoted as tax) and
tfp (and correspondingly a level of real wages (WR*) that is compatible with this
unemployment rate).
(3) LUR*=L(r,tl,tc,tfp) = b1*r+b2*tax+b3*tfp
b1>0, b2>0, b3=0
Most theories imply restrictions on labour supply such that the long run effect of tfp
on LUR* is zero5. Of course there can also be other factors influencing
unemployment which are not captured by this formulation, such as specific events
like German unification, large exogenous shocks to export markets (e.g. the break
down of the former Soviet Union in the case of Finland), other structural reforms in
the labour market affecting the bargaining position of trade unions and employers etc.
We have used time dummies (TD) to represent these factors. Therefore we postulate
the following specification for the equilibrium unemployment rate :
(4) LUR* = b0*TD+b1*r+b2*tax+b3*tfp with b1,b2>0
Because of real and nominal adjustment rigidities, wages and prices will in general
deviate from their equilibrium levels. However, stability requires that the adjustment
of wages and prices will be such that whenever the actual unemployment rate
exceeds/falls short of LUR*, wages will tend to fall/rise, i.e. the coefficient "a" of the
5 This is a fairly standard restriction usually imposed in macro formulations of the labour market and
derives from the observation that in the very long run tfp and the unemployment rate have very
different trends. However, there exists a wide variety of views on the relationship between technical
change and employment. For example, some hypotheses point to the productivity slowdown as a major
reason for the rise in the unemployment rate. Other hypotheses, however, suggest that there is a
positive correlation between measures of tfp and the unemployment rate. For example, in an
environment with skill biased technical progress and relative wage rigidity it is very likely that tfp and
the unemployment rate are positively correlated. Some evidence to support this was, for example,
found by Roeger and Wijkander (1999) for the three largest continental EU countries over the sample
period 1970 to 1995. This correlation was particularly strong in the case of Italy and indispensable for
obtaining a cointegrating relationship between unemployment and structural factors. As will be seen
later on in this paper tfp is still needed in the case of Italy for the later sample period.9
“unemployment gap” (LUR*-LUR) is positive. This equilibrating mechanism
provides additional useful information from wage inflation (Winf) which helps to
identify the NAIRU and therefore we estimate the NAIRU via the following
specification, using non-linear least squares regression (NLS).
(5) Winf=a(LUR*(TD,r,tax,tfp)-LUR)+ c(i)Winf(-i),
 c(i)=1 a>0 6
This implies that LUR* can be identified from estimating equation (5).
For each country the following variables are used:
· TD: CONSTANT/ BREAK IN CONSTANT/ TREND: This refers to the classical concept
of a natural rate and also requires little empirical knowledge.
· R: Ex post real long term interest rate.
· TAX: This is a comprehensive tax measure which includes all direct taxes plus
social security contributions (SSC) as a share of the wage bill.
· TFP: Growth rate of real trend GDP.
The estimate for structural unemployment is given by those coefficients of LUR* and
the corresponding unemployment gap (LUR*-LUR) which best explains wage
inflation, given past levels of wage inflation.
The estimates from equation (5) allow an assessment to be made of the plausibility of
LUR* both on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. The estimates of the
coefficients of LUR* should be consistent with theoretical restrictions imposed by the
wage and the labour demand equations on the structural unemployment rate (i.e. the
coefficients b), and the coefficients should be significant. Also the unemployment gap
should have explanatory power for explaining wage inflation, given past wage
inflation i.e. the coefficient a should be significant.
1.3 TAXATION AND WAGE DETERMINATION -R ESERVATION WAGE /
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM INTERACTIONS: In the model described
above wage setting and labour supply decisions are crucially affected by the ratio
between the net market wage and the reservation wage. In assessing the impact of
taxation on employment it is important therefore to analyse how a change in taxes
affects the reservation wage.
6 Estimation of this equation requires an assumption with regard to the formation of expectations.
Since the inflation process in many countries is dominated by inertia, with year-to-year changes in
inflation being small, the most commonly adopted approach to providing an estimate of inflationary
expectations is to use a distributed lag of past rates of inflation as a proxy for future inflation i.e. a
backward looking specification. A stable inflation rate requires that the sum of the coefficients on the
lagged inflation rate variables equal one. This latter homogeneity restriction implies the absence of any
long run trade off between inflation and unemployment with the unitary coefficient encapsulating the
idea that any given rate of inflation, if left to itself in the sense of no policy interventions to change it,
is self-perpetuating.10
With regard to the reservation wage effect on wages, the first thing to note is that the
reservation wage is composed of unemployment benefits and the value of leisure,
with the crucial determinant for tax effects being unemployment benefits. To the
extent to which benefits are indexed to gross wages, a tax reduction increases the
wedge between net wages and the reservation wage and increases the room to share
the benefits of lower labour taxes between workers and firms. In contrast, if tax rates
on benefits and wages were kept equal, the effect of taxation would be small and it
would entirely disappear if the value of leisure goes to zero. This suggests that the
interaction of the tax / benefit systems, and in particular the indexation link between
benefits and wages (i.e. gross vs. net) plays a vital role in determining the effects of
taxation on wage setting. However, it should be stressed that other institutional factors
also play a role. The analysis by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggests that the
bargaining structure plays an important part in determining the extent to which tax
increases are shifted onto wages. In particular it has been argued that centralised and
large unions would internalise the macroeconomic consequences of wage increases
more strongly compared with equivalently strong but decentralised unions.
1.4 RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION OF THE REAL INTEREST RATE
VARIABLE: While most of the variables which are used in the above estimation
process would find widespread support in the literature, more controversial is the
choice of the real interest rate variable. Higher real interest rates have a potential
impact on unemployment via the knock-on effect on firms of increases in their cost of
capital which reduces both investment and the capital stock and ultimately
employment. To the extent that these additional financing costs are not taken into
account in the wage bargaining system, equilibrating employees' real wage demands
with the mark-up ambitions of employers may necessitate higher levels of
unemployment. The big question, however, is whether it is credible to believe that
these interest rate-induced unemployment increases are likely to be structural or
cyclical in nature. Many commentators find the theoretical and empirical case for a
secular growth in unemployment consequent to higher real interest rates difficult to
justify and instead argue that the effects are likely to be temporary, with the real wage
aspirations of workers likely to adjust over time in much the same way as with shifts
in trend productivity, although the length of the transition phase could be considerable
especially in countries with particularly inflexible institutional setups where the
impact of shocks tend to persist.
The model developed above is sufficiently flexible to allow for the latter view of real
interest rates interacting with a relatively rigid institutional framework here in Europe.
The criteria adopted for the final model selection are based not only on theoretical
considerations but in fact give precedence to the empirical explanatory power of the
NAIRU series which is generated by the model in terms of tracking past trends in
inflation. In addition, the real interest rate variable is only selected for those countries
where a robust statistical relationship is shown to exist and where the parameter is
correctly signed from an economic theory point of view. In this regard the model
developed in the paper is essentially one for calculating a short-run NAIRU as
opposed to a long run structural rate. Consequently, it is capable of picking up some
transitory or persistence effects, emanating from perhaps a mixture of supply and11
demand side influences, which will be resolved in the longer run when the price and
wage dynamics have settled down and the long run steady state is finally reached.
The difficulty experienced in the present study in distinguishing structural as opposed
to purely cyclical links between real interest rates and unemployment seems also to be
reflected in the empirical literature on this topic, where diametrically opposing effects
have been found. Some authors such as Darby, Ireland and Wren-Lewis (1992),
Barrell, Pain and Young (1993), Manning (1992 and 1993), Phelps (1992 and 1994)
and Scarpetta (1996)7 point to significant positive effects on the NAIRU from real
interest rate movements, whereas other papers, notably by Carruth, Hooker and
Oswald (1993) and Bean (1994) show effects close to zero.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN NAIRU CONCEPTS
The distinction between the short and long run NAIRU concepts is an important one,
especially here in Europe, given the difficulties in estimating a long run NAIRU and
of adjusting to the latter in an environment of hysteresis / persistence mechanisms.
The essential difference between both concepts is that the long run NAIRU is
characterised by stability in terms of both inflation and unemployment whereas for the
short-run NAIRU, only inflation is stable. This latter stability is perhaps fragile in
some countries since, the above-mentioned, hysteresis type mechanisms may impose
limits on the speed with which the economy can return to the long-run NAIRU, with,
for example, policies aimed at rapidly reducing unemployment being potentially
costly in terms of inflation.
The short-run NAIRU concept should, in fact, be seen as a reduced-form as opposed
to a structural concept, which encompasses not only the longer run structural
determinants of the NAIRU (such as real interest rates, replacement ratios and tax
burdens) but also reflects the dynamic adjustment of the economy to past economic
shocks, as reflected in the impact of the unemployment gap on wage or price inflation.
The preference in the present paper for calculating a short-run NAIRU reflects a
number of arguments including the fact that for most European countries it is virtually
impossible to measure a purely structural natural rate given the difficulty in finding
credible indicators to pick up all the supply side factors which are likely to impact on
the natural rate whilst at the same time ensuring that these latter factors are immune
from the influence of cyclical determinants.
7 Although in commenting on the results of the reduced form regressions on the total unemployment
rate, Scarpetta states that "there is no evidence that over the 1983-1993 period that changes in the long
term interest rates have significantly affected labour market conditions".12
SECTION 2: E MPIRICALTESTING OF "HYBRID" NAIRU / NAWRU
MODEL
2.1 OUTLINE OF TESTING STRATEGY : In overall terms, the model developed
in Section 1 revolves around a basic equation for explaining inflation in the different
countries, with inflation being a function of the unemployment gap and a distributed
lag of past inflation. Various permutations to this specification were used in the
NAIRU estimation process including using different inflation indicators (wage
inflation or general, economy-wide, inflation as measured by the GDP deflator),
various structural variables (labour taxation, wider measure of tax pressure, gross and
net replacement ratios, real interest rates, trend productivity growth as well as a
demographic variable which was included to pick up changes in the ratio of the
population of working age to total population) allied to different lag structures for the
respective variables. In terms of the inflation variable used, one possible difference
between countries is that unemployment gap developments may be a more useful
predictor of wage inflation than of price inflation (this in fact is the case in all the
countries, except Portugal and the Netherlands, and consequently in this paper we are
normally measuring a NAWRU as opposed to a NAIRU).
EXPECTED SIGN OF COEFFICIENTS : Economic theory would suggest positive
signs for the coefficients for lagged inflation, taxation and real interest rate variables
and a negative coefficient for the trend growth variable. In a bargaining framework of
wage determination, real interest rates and the NAIRU would be expected to be
positively related, with the transmission channel between the two, as mentioned
earlier, revolving around the idea of a wedge between the target real wage of
employees and the feasible real wage on the employers side. Furthermore, for the
most important term, the unemployment gap, which measures the influence of the gap
on inflation, given that this is estimated as the NAIRU less the actual unemployment
rate, one would expect to see a positive coefficient. This in fact is the case with all
the equation results, with a positive coefficient on the unemployment gap term
indicating that wage inflation seems to respond to disequilibrium in the respective
labour markets. Given these feedback effects it is clear that this unemployment gap
term could be used as a rough indicator of the relative real wage flexibility of the
respective labour markets.
As illustrated in Graph 1, using the example of the UK (see Section 3 for Graphs for
all the countries), the objective of the estimation process is to try to extract a NAIRU
estimate which is linked not to inflation but to the change in inflation. In other words
we are trying to choose the NAIRU estimate which gives the best fit over the
historical sample period i.e. the NAIRU which is best at tracking past changes in
inflation. A number of different methods of estimation were experimented with (eg
trend estimation using the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter8, the constant NAIRU
8 The Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter approach is a trend estimation method which basically uses a long-run moving
average to detrend a particular series, in this case unemployment. Using the H-P filter is justified for calculating
the natural component of unemployment since the latter concept assumes that factors affecting the natural rate are
infrequent and are slow to change.13
approach9, the Perron trend break method and a « structural » approach ). In the end
the « structural » approach (described in Section 1), using various specifications and
lag structures, was adopted in all cases, except Italy (see discussion on Italy in Box 1
at end of Section 3), as being the best approach for generating a NAIRU / NAWRU
which is good in terms of tracking the change in inflation.
GRAPH 1: UK UNEMPLOYMENT GAP + CHANGE IN INFLATION
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In terms of the final variables selected, while the experiments with the gross and net
replacement rate series got good results, they had to be abandoned in the end since the
series were not long enough to produce NAIRU estimates up to 1999. However, it
was found that the replacement rate variables acted as a proxy for the labour taxation
variable. In overall terms, as shown in Table 3, it was the taxation and real interest
rate variables which proved the best in terms of the equation results. The trend growth
in productivity series yielded in general poor results which, on reflection, is perhaps
not that surprising given the strong long-run link between real wages and real labour
productivity trends.
2.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS : As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 and
graphically at the end of this section, Member States are split evenly between those
countries experiencing increases in the NAIRU over the period 1990-1999 and those
witnessing a decline10. As shown in Table 3, the wage equations fit the data
reasonably well in the majority of cases and the equations perform satisfactorily on
the basis of the standard statistical criteria. The most important point to retain from
the analysis undertaken is that in all of the Member States for which NAIRU's are
estimated, that the unemployment gap would appear to be important in explaining
past changes in either wage or price inflation, with effects of between 0.5 and 1 being
9 Note: While the constant NAIRU estimation method delivered very poor results for the Community countries, it
worked extremely well for the United States, yielding a NAIRU of 5.8% for the 1993-1999 period as a whole.
10 It should be noted that if one looks at NAIRU developments over a longer period of time, the
Community’s Member States have, in general, experienced significant upward shifts in their Phillips
curves, and consequently in their NAIRU estimates, reflecting significant changes to the structure of
the respective labour markets since the early 1970s. Structural or equilibrium unemployment in the
Community as a whole, according to a large number of studies, steadily rose from cycle to cycle, with a
deterioration in the underlying responsiveness of the labour market being reflected in rising NAIRUs
and persistence mechanisms.14
registered in most cases. In addition, as indicated in section 3, the unemployment gap
term is broadly stationary for all countries. In other words, testing for cointegration in
this way suggests that the specification used for the various Member States seems
sufficient to capture the trend in unemployment in those countries.
TABLE1 : NAIRU ESTIMATES (1990-1999)
1990 1993 1996 1999
Belgium 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.0
Denmark 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.6
Germany 5.6 6.2 7.4 8.8
Greece 7.3 8.0 9.1 10.1
Spain 18.5 18.9 18.2 16.6
France 9.6 10.2 10.7 11.3
Ireland 14.1 13.4 11.7 9.3
Italy 9.9 10.4 10.9 11.3
Netherlands 7.0 6.3 5.3 4.0
Austria 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.3
Portugal 4.9 5.5 5.4 4.2
Finland 4.7 17.0 14.6 12.2
Sweden 5.9 7.9 7.4 6.5
UK 9.3 8.7 7.8 6.8
Table 2 : 1999 NAIRU + 90% Confidence Intervals 11
LOWER
LIMIT
NAIRU
POINT ESTIMATE
UPPER
LIMIT
Belgium 5.2 8.0 10.9
Denmark 2.5 5.6 8.6
Germany 6.8 8.8 10.7
Greece 3.7 10.1 16.6
Spain 13.8 16.6 19.4
France 8.6 11.3 14.0
Ireland 6.3 9.3 12.3
Italy 9.9 11.3 12.7
Netherlands 1.9 4.0 6.0
Austria 2.4 4.3 6.2
Portugal 0.0 4.2 8.5
Finland 8.7 12.2 15.8
Sweden 3.8 6.5 9.3
UK 3.7 6.8 9.9
11 The confidence interval is calculated as the linear combination of the variables affecting the NAIRU multiplied
with their respective coefficients. It must be regarded as an approximation to the true interval since with non-
stationary variables the distribution of the coefficient estimate is only standard in the absence of a correlation
between the residual of the cointegrating relationship and the residuals of the explanatory variables.15
TABLE 3: EQUATION RESULTS12
WAGEEQUATIONS:N ON-LINEARLEASTSQUARESREGRESSION
UNEMP
GAP
CON-
STANT
REAL
INTEREST
RATE
TAX
BURDEN
TOTAL
FACTOR
PRODY
LAGGED
INFL
R-SQ13
(D-W
STAT)
BELGIUM 0.996
(3.58)
0.057
(3.21)
0.549
(1.79)
0.369
(1.93)
0.64
(1.41)
DENMARK
****
0.545
(2.16)
0.506
(1.95)
1.474
(1.73)
0.669
(3.08)
0.63
(1.97)
GERMANY
*
0.381
(3.28)
-0.293
(-2.42)
0.660
(3.02)
0.916
(6.16)
0.89
(2.53)
GREECE
****
4.624
(1.60)
0.140
(22.27)
0.959
(4.08)
0.48
(2.02)
SPAIN 0.412
(2.46)
1.596
(2.08)
0.530**
(2.17)
0.718
(3.15)
0.86
(2.13)
FRANCE 0.524
(1.43)
-0.168
(-1.66)
0.493
(2.64)
0.985
(3.99)
0.88
(1.74)
IRELAND 0.524
(2.86)
0.073
(4.50)
0.998
(3.58)
1.140
(6.00)
0.90
(2.16)
AUSTRIA 1.735
(3.29)
-0.064
(-2.39)
0.491
(1.93)
0.149
(3.16)
0.902
(6.73)
0.72
(1.84)
FINLAND
***
0.370
(2.17)
0.741
(2.51)
1.150
(6.04)
0.76
(2.11)
SWEDEN
***
0.369
(2.55)
1.172
(5.84)
0.445
(2.36)
0.66
(1.90)
UK
****
1.057
(4.01)
0.536
(3.07)
0.164
(8.80)
0.634
(3.63)
0.85
(1.62)
PRICEEQUATIONS:N ON-LINEARLEASTSQUARESREGRESSION
NETHS 0.297
(1.95)
1.158
(7.82)
0.989
(4.53)
0.56
(1.84)
POR-
TUGAL
0.550
(3.56)
1.773
(4.67)
1.158
(5.35)
0.90
(1.40)
* Germany: Dummy variables included to correct for unification.
** Spain : Labour tax burden (not the total tax burden).
*** Finland and Sweden: Dummy variables included to allow for the jump in
unemployment at the beginning of 1990's in both countries.
**** UK and Greece:Time trend included from 1991 onwards.
Denmark : Time trend included from 1995 onwards.
12 T-statistic appears in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
13 R-squared corrected for degrees of freedom.16
However, while the sign and size of the model coefficients are economically
meaningful, past experience suggests caution in using such models for predicting
future price pressures, in isolation from the many other inflation indicators which are
available. This is especially true given the normal parameter and model uncertainty
which clouds any NAIRU / NAWRU estimates. While statistically significant
estimates were obtained in the present exercise, as Table 3 shows the latter point
estimates are not very precise, and as can be seen in Table 2 using the example of
1999, the confidence intervals around the point estimates for all countries are
relatively wide, thereby reducing their usefulness as policy guides. These latter
measurement problems are hardly surprising given the well-documented instabilities
in the Phillips curve for many of the Community's Member States.
2.3 SPECIFICCOMMENTS ON THEEFFECTS OF THE TAXATION AND REAL
INTERESTRATEVARIABLES
TAXATION: Concerning the effects of taxation, it is interesting to observe that the
results presented in Table 3 are broadly consistent with previous results obtained by
Daveri and Tabellini in their seminal 1997 article on the link between the observed
rise in labour tax rates in Europe and the concomitant slowdown in economic growth
and rise in unemployment over the period from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s.
Since the employment effect of taxes was expected by the authors to depend on the
bargaining structure, Daveri and Tabellini partitioned an OECD data set into the
following three groups; firstly European countries where trade unions play a big role
but are decentralised; secondly Anglo saxon countries where labour markets are more
competitive; and finally Scandinavian countries where unions are large and
centralised.
Though the present paper neither constrained regression coefficients within groups
nor across groups, nevertheless similar coefficient groupings emerge from the
regressions. Table 3 shows the largest tax effects (with similar size) for Germany,
Spain and France. Similar to results obtained by Daveri and Tabellini, an increase in
the tax rate by 1% point increases the structural unemployment rate by about half a
point. Furthermore, the present research does not find a significant effect from
taxation in the Scandinavian countries nor in Belgium and the Netherlands. Finally,
only a very small tax effect is found for the UK. Results for Greece, Ireland, Austria
and Portugal are not directly comparable because they are not included in the Daveri
and Tabellini study.
ARE THE EFFECTS ON NAWRU / NAIRU TRENDS EMANATING FROM
REAL INTEREST RATES CREDIBLE OR ARE THESE EFFECTS MASKING
DEMAND INFLUENCES?:It is very interesting to observe that the real interest rate
variable plays a key role in NAWRU / NAIRU developments in 10 of the 13
countries. What is more surprising is both the size of the expected effects and the fact
that for a number of countries which have experienced substantial declines in their
structural unemployment rates that real interest rate developments would appear to be
the main explanation. While structural reform clearly plays a role in terms of real
interest rate developments, the latter association between real interest rates and17
NAIRU declines might be a difficult one to explain to policy makers in the context of
its implications for the broad thrust of structural initiatives in their respective
countries.
Because of these latter concerns, it was decided to try to examine whether, as stated
earlier in the paper, these interest rate-induced trend unemployment changes are likely
to be structural or cyclical in nature. In other words could any other variable be found
which would work equally as well in the country equations as the real interest rate
variable appeared to do ?. A large number of variables were tested, including the
investment to output ratio, trend growth, competitiveness indicators such as real
exchange rate movements, as well as dummy variables indicating dates of major
labour market reforms14. However, none of these variables could significantly
improve the fit of the estimated equation. It was finally decided to include a variable
in the equation to mimic the effect of cyclical demand changes. This variable
measures the deviation from trend growth (calculated as the residual of an OLS
equation which regresses the log of the GDP series against time) and when included
in the equations for a number of countries produced good results, especially for some
of those Member States which have experienced large declines in their NAIRU's over
the period in question, such as the UK and Ireland.
Regarding these latter results, however, it should be stressed that, despite the
relatively good performance achieved by the deviation from trend growth variable in
certain countries, this explanatory variable did not perform nearly as well as the real
interest variable in overall terms. Consequently, it would appear that while a
proportion of the real interest effects which are shown in our results may emanate
from a short to medium term real interest effect on demand, it would also appear that
real interest rate developments have an additional longer run (i.e. structural) influence
on NAIRU / NAWRU trends.
14 Dummy variables are obviously only crude measures for labour market reforms. From a statistical
point of view, it would certainly be preferable to have more precise time series indicators, measuring
certain aspects of labour market rigidities, like adjustment costs, bargaining strength of unions, tax
disincentives for certain categories of workers, etc. Unfortunately, such measures are hard to construct
o nat i m es e r i e sb a s i s .18
NAIRU ESTIMATES,C ONFIDENCE INTERVALS AND ACTUAL
UNEMPLOYMENT15
(1990-1999)
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* GERMANY: With regard to the 1990's, the estimates for Germany suggest that structural unemployment has been rising in that
country over the period. It is clear from the regression results that the trend of the NAIRU series is strongly influenced by the
rising direct labour tax burden (including social security contributions) which has been a feature in Germany in the 1990’s.
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* SPAIN : The overall picture for Spain presented for the period as a whole indicates a relatively rapid decline in recent years in
structural unemployment. This development is due to a strong decline in real interest rates in Spain. A lagged employment
response to a reduction in effective labour taxes is also present. However, since labour tax rates have stayed roughly constant in
recent years, they do not explain the recent fall in structural unemployment.
15 As is the practice with the OECD's NAWRU series, the NAIRU/NAWRU series produced using the approach presented in
this paper are smoothed using a HP filter to remove any erratic year to year movements. However, it should be noted that the
graphs in section 3.2 of this paper, which compare unemployment gaps and changes in wage/price inflation use the unsmoothed
NAIRU series since it is the actual year to year changes which we are interested in.19
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* FRANCE : The continuing rising trend evident in the results for France is not that surprising given that the final model selected
places a lot of emphasis on the importance of the continuing rise in the overall burden of taxation in that country, with the
preferred distributed lag specification (covering a period of the previous three years) suggesting that the effects of tax increases
persist for a significant period of time.
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* AUSTRIA : The final specification used for Austria shows a role for the trend increase in tax pressure which has taken place in
this Member State over the sample period chosen and also a role for real interest rate developments in determining the NAIRU.
As can be seen from the graph in section 3.2, the final model chosen tracks the change in inflation reasonably well.
**FINLAND: In terms of the determinants of the Finnish structural unemployment rate series, the NAIRU estimates, through the
use of a dummy variable, allow for a jump in the structural unemployment rate in that country at the beginning of the 1990s. In
addition, the regression results also indicate that real interest rates have a significant effect on the Finnish structural
unemployment rate, however with a lag of about 2 years. (Note: Confidence intervals are not given in the graph for Finland
because the break in the NAIRU series rendered the inclusion of such intervals difficult. In this regard, it is sufficient to point
out that the confidence interval given for 1999 for Finland in Table 2 of the text is representative for the 1990's as a whole.)20
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* SWEDEN : In the case of Sweden the explanation concerning the break in the NAIRU series given earlier in the footnote for
Finland can be equally applied (as indeed can the point made with regard to the exclusion of confidence intervals).
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* NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL : It is important to note that the series for the Netherlands and Portugal are NAIRU's not
NAWRU's.21
SECTION 3:H OWGOOD ARE THENAIRU ESTIMATES INEXPLAINING
PAST CHANGES INWAGE/PRICEINFLATION ?
While Section 2 clearly demonstrates that the modelling strategy adopted yields
meaningful NAIRU estimates in both statistical and economic terms, it is important to
assess these results in a number of different ways in order to establish :
· firstly, whether the model variables are capable of capturing the trend in
unemployment in the various Member States i.e. can a hypothesis of no
cointegration be rejected by the data. This essentially amounts to a test of whether
the unemployment gap term is stationary or not for the individual countries.
(Section 3.1).
· secondly, to assess graphically whether the unemployment gaps generated, using
the estimated NAIRU / NAWRU estimates, are capable of tracking past changes
in wage or price inflation. (Section 3.2).
· thirdly, how do the unemployment gaps, using the estimated NAIRU's, compare
in terms of their inflationary explanatory power with unemployment gaps which
are generated by a simple statistical smoothing technique such as the H-P filter. In
other words, does the economic approach adopted in the paper yield any benefits
over and above those of widely used univariate statistical methods? (Section 3.3).
· finally, how useful are the NAIRU estimates generated in this paper in output gap
models of price inflation. Again, as in section 3.3, the objective in this section is
to try to assess whether it is really worthwhile to go to the trouble of estimating
economically significant TV-NAIRU's. (Section 3.4).
3.1 IST H EUNEMPLOYMENT GAP TERM A STATIONARY OR NON-
STATIONARY PROCESS ? : The distinction between a stationary and a non-
stationary series is an important one and depends on whether or not the variable
contains a unit root. If the unemployment gap series, LURGAP, is non-stationary (i.e.
it may not be mean reverting) this would suggest that our modelling strategy is not
picking up all the elements which are influencing the movements of LURGAP.
Consequently, it is important to establish the order of integration of the LURGAP
series, by determining the properties of the data using formal unit root testing i.e. is
the LURGAP variable stationary in levels or does it have to be differenced a number
of times before becoming stationary. If, for example, first differencing eliminates the
trending behaviour in the variable, then we can say that the variable is I(1), i.e.
integrated of order one.
It must be stressed that unit root testing is neither a simple nor definitive process but
use of both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which allows for a constant and
has an adequate lag structure, combined with the sequential testing strategy which
underpins the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests is widely accepted as being an appropriate
testing strategy. Testing for the presence of a unit root can be carried out in several
different ways with the approach adopted here being a combination of the ADF and
PP tests. Given that the trend should already have been removed from the series, it is22
only necessary to allow for the intercept term to enter the regression model. The null
hypothesis to be tested is that the time series is non-stationary (i.e. it contains a unit
root) against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity.
ADF and PP statistics for the level of the LURGAP variable are shown in the Table
below and when compared with the MacKinnon critical values suggest stationarity or
borderline stationarity, with the vast majority of the countries rejecting the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity for either the ADF or PP tests at the 10% level. While
these results do not appear to provide overwhelming support for stationarity, it should
be borne in mind that these test statistics lose a lot of their explanatory power when
the number of observations used are small, as in the present case. Recently, attempts
have been made to increase the power of cointegration tests by taking into account the
cross section dimension in cases where the time series are not very long but similar
data are available across countries. The most general formulation of a panel
cointegration test to date is the one from Pedroni (1997, 1999) which allows both
fixed effects and heterogeneous coefficients across cross sectional units. Pedroni
develops various panel cointegration tests and especially extends the ADF and PP
tests. He shows that these panel cointegration statistics approximately follow a
standard normal distribution after appropriate standardisation. As can be seen from
the results of the panel cointegration test shown below, the hypothesis of no
cointegration can be rejected at the 5% level for the panel of all EU countries.
Statistical Stationary Tests for the EC's Member States
1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Tests in Levels*
- (Intercept included in test equation with 1 lag) -
ADF
TEST STATISTIC
PP
TEST STATISTIC
Belgium -2.87 -2.51
Denmark -2.08 -3.41
Germany -2.89 -2.69
Greece -6.52 -4.44
Spain -2.40 -1.91
France -2.68 -1.67
Ireland -1.99 -2.70
Italy -2.99 -1.96
Netherlands -3.00 -2.27
Austria -2.49 -2.55
Portugal -2.48 -4.11
Finland -1.97 -2.03
Sweden -1.46 -2.65
UK -3.09 -2.54
* MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root
Intercept Included
1% critical value = - 3.49
5% critical value = - 2.89
10% critical value = - 2.58
2. Panel Cointegration Test (Pedroni 1999)
Group PP Statistic = -1.89**
Group ADF Statistic = -2.59**
**5% critical value =- 1.6923
3.2 UNEMPLOYMENT GAPS AND CHANGES IN WAGE /P RICE INFLATION
(1980 -1999): As the graphs below clearly indicate the estimated unemployment
gaps are remarkably good, in most cases, at explaining past inflationary
developments, at least in relation to wage developments. The results in terms of
general price inflation are less good for the two countries, namely the Netherlands and
Portugal, where the GDP deflator as opposed to wage inflation was used in the
modelling process. In relation specifically to the latter countries, while the graph
showing the relationship between the change in price inflation and the unemployment
gap is not particularly good in terms of its tracking performance, one needs to
remember that the change in price inflation is much more difficult to track using an
unemployment gap, as opposed to an output gap, series with many non-labour market
influences often playing a key role.
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* FRANCE : In the above graph which shows unemployment gaps and changes in wage/price inflation, one sees that the
NAWRU series (as included in the unemployment gap series) for the last two years appears to provide a very good
approximation for changes in wage inflation. Over that period the estimated unemployment gap is virtually eliminated whilst at
the same time wage inflation appears to be broadly stable. Some additional work was carried out to test the contention that the
NAWRU series may not be picking up some break in the structural unemployment series in France in the early to mid-1990's.
When one tests for such a break, using both shift and trend breaks, one finds some evidence of a shift break around 1992/93.
However, it was decided to stick with the specification shown above since the inclusion of the shift break did not change either
the absolute size, or direction of change, of the NAWRU series and, very importantly, while the tracking performance of the
unemployment gap series relative to the change in wage inflation did improve for the period as a whole, it deteriorated badly at
the beginning of the 1990's.
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3.3 COMPARISON WITH H-P FILTER DERIVED UNEMPLOYMENT GAPS.
HOW WELL DO THE ESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT GAP VH PF ILTER
DERIVED UNEMPLOYMENT GAPS EXPLAIN PAST CHANGES IN WAGE
INFLATION?
As the table and graphs below indicate, the results of this comparison are very
encouraging for the methodology adopted in this paper, since they indicate that for
each Member State there is a gain to be made by estimating an economically
significant NAIRU series, with the gain in certain countries being very significant in
terms of both the explanatory power of the NAIRU's and in terms of the significance
of the relationship between the unemployment gaps and past changes in wage
inflation.
TABLE :E STIMATEDUNEMPLOYMENT GAPVH PF ILTERUNEMPLOYMENT GAP
Estimated Gap HP Filter Gap
R-Squared t-Statistic R-Squared t-Statistic
Belgium 0.23 2.34 0.16 1.87
Denmark 0.18 1.96 0.08 1.27
Germany 0.17 1.95 0.12 1.60
Greece 0.01 0.48 0.001 0.05
Spain 0.32 2.82 0.30 2.77
France 0.15 1.75 0.12 1.56
Ireland 0.48 4.06 0.08 1.22
Austria 0.42 3.60 0.21 2.19
Finland 0.23 2.29 0.001 0.05
Sweden 0.08 1.22 0.001 0.04
UK 0.57 4.90 0.23 2.3027
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3.4 REAL DISEQUILIBRIUM MEASURES:U NEMPLOYMENT VO UTPUT
GAPS
The essential question to be addressed in this section is whether economic, as opposed
to statistical, estimates of trend or structural unemployment can help in improving the
inflationary explanatory power of output gap calculations (i.e. the gap between actual
and potential output)?.
The first thing to stress is that the unemployment gap and the output gap estimates are
linked in a number of different ways:
· Firstly, they are both real disequilibria measures - although one wouldn’t
necessarily expect both these measures of real disequilibrium to coincide in terms
of their movements over time since non-labour market influences on price
inflation must also be taken into account;
· Secondly, they are linked due to the fact that the unemployment gap is often used
as an important input into the output gap calculations. It is this latter connection
which the present section concentrates on.
This section presents two different sets of output gap estimates, both of which are
based on a production function approach using the Commission’s services QUEST
model, but with one set of calculations using a Hodrick Prescott generated trend
unemployment rate and with the other using the NAIRU estimates as calculated in the
present paper. The objective is to see whether by using the economically derived
NAWRU/NAIRU estimates, in preference to a statistical method such as the H-P
filter, we can improve on the price inflation tracking performance of the resultant
output gap calculations. Before going on to discuss the different calculations, a short
digression is necessary to provide a quick overview of the production function
approach for calculating output gaps in the Quest II model.
PRODUCTION FUNCTION DERIVED OUTPUT GAPS: The calculation of output
gaps based on a production function approach assumes that at the aggregate level
there exists a technical relationship linking output to various factor inputs - multiplied
with their respective degree of utilisation - and the level of total factor productivity.
The parameters of the production function essentially determine the output elasticities
of individual inputs.
The concept of an output gap within the production function framework revolves
around the idea that the gap can be decomposed into three cyclical variables, namely
the deviation of unemployment from its normal level (i.e. the unemployment gap), the
degree of excess capacity and finally, fluctuations of technology around its trend.
Trend total factor productivity can be estimated from a simple vintage specification
that is used in the QUEST model. The production function approach also requires
estimates of "normal" unemployment rates. Simple detrending methods are usually
used to calculate these but, as stated in the introductory paragraph to this section, the
calculated NAIRU's are also used and the results of the two different measures of the
output gap are compared in terms of their relative ability to explain past changes in
price inflation.
It should be emphasised at the outset that applying a production function approach to
calculating output gaps does not necessarily lead to significantly different output gaps29
than those obtained via simple statistical methods. The production function approach
essentially amounts to calculating cyclical components of the inputs. It is relatively
easy to see that applying a linear filter with common weights to individual
components is identical to applying the filter to the output series itself. A gain from
using a production function approach can only be expected if it is easier to extract
cyclical components from input factors (unemployment and total factor productivity)
than from GDP itself or if it seems necessary to apply very different detrending
methods to the individual inputs.
In overall terms, with a production function, potential GDP (Y) can be represented by
a combination of factor inputs - employment (L) and capital (K) at the aggregate
level -, corrected for the degree of excess capacity (UC) and multiplied with the
technological level or total factor productivity (total factor productivity). In many
empirical applications (including the QUEST model), a Cobb Douglas specification is
chosen for the functional form as this greatly simplifies estimation and exposition.
Thus potential GDP is given by:
TFP K L UC Y ) (
1 a a - = (1)
where a and ) 1 ( a - represent the output elasticities of labour and capital
respectively.
OUTPUT GAPS BASED ON BOTH ECONOMIC &S TATISTICALLY DERIVED
TREND UNEMPLOYMENT: As explained above, the production function
approach to calculating output gaps requires estimates to be provided for equilibrium
unemployment. For the purposes of the present exercise two approaches have been
used to estimate the trend or structural unemployment rate, one mechanical (i.e. the
H-P Filter) and one economically estimated (i.e. the Phillips curve derived NAIRU's
a sg i v e ni ns e c t i o n2o ft h i sp a p e r ) . Ac o m p a r i s o no ft h ei n f l a t i o nt r a c k i n g
performance of output gaps using both these methods is given in Table 2.
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from the Table overleaf, in relation to
output gaps and price inflation, is how little output gaps explain of the change in price
inflation. Of the 13 countries for which we have calculated NAIRU's, in only 3 of
them, namely Ireland, the UK and Germany, do output gaps explain in excess of 20%
of the change in price inflation over the period 1980 to 1999. With regard to the
usefulness of the calculated NAIRU's relative to the HP-filtered NAIRU's, there
would appear to be a sizeable gain in the information content of the calculated
NAIRU's for the three countries in question, with the coefficient of determination and
the overall significance of the relationship increasing for all 3 countries, especially
Ireland (see graph overleaf).30
TABLE :H OW WELL DOOUTPUT GAPS EXPLAIN PAST CHANGES IN PRICE
INFLATION?A COMPARISON OF OUTPUT GAPS USING ESTIMATED
NAIRU'S ANDHP FILTEREDNAIRU'S
OUTPUT GAPS
Using Estimated NAIRU's Using HP Filtered NAIRU's
R-Squared t-Statistic R-Squared t-Statistic
Belgium 0.0003 0.076 0.0002 0.063
Denmark 0.045 0.926 0.035 0.805
Germany 0.308 2.831 0.205 2.155
Greece 0.004 0.27 0.003 0.238
Spain 0.036 0.817 0.046 0.935
France 0.088 1.319 0.121 1.573
Ireland 0.206 2.162 0.026 0.692
Austria 0.013 0.496 0.012 0.474
Finland 0.032 0.773 0.0001 0.038
Sweden 0.0001 0.016 0.005 0.305
UK 0.318 2.899 0.258 2.500
Italy* 0.443 3.785 .452 3.857
Netherlands 0.078 1.231 .019 0.589
Portugal 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.237
*NAIRU series is virtually identical to a HP filter
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BOX1:I TALY
As mentioned earlier in the text, Italy is the only country in the EU where the
« structural » method failed to produce a satisfactory NAIRU series. In other words,
the macroeconomic indicators turned out to be insufficient to explain the trend
movement of the Italian unemployment rate. This suggests that an important
influencing factor is missing. In trying to resolve this problem 3 different
approaches were adopted:
· A univariate approach;
· The inclusion in the standard specification of a variable which measures the
deviation from trend growth over the estimation period; and finally,
· The inclusion of a variable to allow for skill-biased technical progress.
UNIVARIATE APPROACH: A univariate trending method- the HP filter- was used
to produce a proxy for the « structural » unemployment series. Univariate methods
are essentially statistical as opposed to economic models of the NAIRU, with the
underlying assumption being that unemployment always reverts to its mean or
natural rate over time. If the latter assumption is true then the NAIRU can be
defined uniquely in terms of the behaviour of the unemployment series itself.
However, while the trend unemployment series for Italy produced using this
approach appeared to give a reasonable proxy compared with actual
unemployment, it was also clear that this series told us very little about the change
in wage inflation in Italy over the period.
DEVIATION FROM TREND GROWTH : Given the generally unsatisfactory results
using the univariate method, it was decided to try a variable which essentially
measures the deviation from trend growth over the period 1980-1999. When this
variable was introduced in the basic equation, the results were substantially better
in terms of the overall fit of the equation. Unfortunately, the unemployment gap
series produced using this new NAIRU estimate was still poor in terms of tracking
past changes in inflation.
SKILL-BIASED TECHNICAL PROGRESS: Given the poor inflation tracking
performance using the above two methods, a variable for skilled biased technical
progress was included in the basic specification. When this variable was introduced
it performed reasonably well in terms of the basic equation results. This appears to
confirm the results of a previous analysis by Roeger and Wijkander (see references)
which showed that the inclusion of a proxy variable for relative wage rigidity in the
presence of skill biased technical progress, namely the ratio between total factor
productivity in manufacturing and services, provides cointegration in the case of
Italy. However, while the structural unemployment series produced using the latter
approach may appear (see graph overleaf) a reasonable proxy compared with
actual unemployment, it is unfortunately still very poor in terms of explaining the
change in wage inflation in Italy over the period in question.32
COULD HYSTERESIS MECHANISMS PROVIDE PART OF THE EXPLANATION FOR THE
ITALIAN CASE ?: From the above analysis, it would appear that in Italy that wages
do not react very much to disequilibria in the labour market. Normally, higher
levels of unemployment would be expected to help the adjustment process by putting
downward pressure on wages, but with hysteresis present this downward pressure is
rather muted and the economy takes considerably longer to return to its original
equilibrium. Hysteresis consequently acts to prevent the necessary degree of real
wage adjustment from occurring with the result that temporary shocks have
permanent or persistent effects on unemployment. In this regard, it is significant to
note that in a previous analysis (Mc Morrow –1997) it was found that Italy was the
only country in the EU where the change in unemployment variable was
substantially more important than the level of unemployment as an explanatory
variable in wage developments. This may suggest that the change in the
unemployment variable has an independent and significant influence on wage
developments in Italy and that therefore "speed limits" on growth could be a
problem in that Member State. i.e. inflation responds not only to the size of the
unemployment or output gap, but to the speed at which the gap is closed, with the
faster the recovery phase, the greater the risk that inflation will accelerate before
the NAIRU is reached.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
As stressed at the outset, estimating NAIRU's, especially those for European
countries, is an exercise fraught with well documented difficulties, including
uncertainties concerning both model selection, where a number of plausible but
fundamentally different modelling approaches exist for their estimation, and empirical
inadequacies, including often large confidence intervals surrounding the resultant
NAIRU point estimates. With regard to the present study, while statistically
significant NAIRU's were obtained, the latter point estimates have, in general,
comparatively low t-statistics and consequently relatively large confidence intervals,
thereby reducing their usefulness as policy guides. In addition, interpreting changes
in NAIRU's should always be done with caution not only because of the unreliability
of the estimates themselves, but also, and very importantly here in Europe, because of
the possible presence of hysteresis mechanisms which have the effect that the NAIRU
often gravitates towards the prevailing rate of unemployment.
Hysteresis is a feature of labour markets which have been "slack" for some time, in
that they become less flexible and more inefficient through skill loss, reduced search
effectiveness etc. with the present performance of such labour markets to an extent
being dictated by the shocks which they have been subjected to in the past. This
hysteresis argument forms part of the consensus view regarding European
unemployment which purports that the high level of the latter is due to the interaction
of two particular effects i.e. a combination of real shocks allied to relatively rigid
institutional structures. Particular aspects of these latter structures, such as insider-
outsider mechanisms, restrictive hiring and firing rules, generous systems of long-
term unemployment benefit provision appear to result in the effects of negative
shocks persisting over an extended period of time.
While conscious of the many problems, highlighted above, associated with NAIRU
calculations, the approach in this paper has been to try to pinpoint a number of key
"sinners", amongst the many possible contributory factors to the trend growth in
unemployment, by isolating those causal variables which are statistically significant
and are economically plausible and by testing the explanatory power of the resultant
NAIRU and unemployment gap measures in terms of their ability to track past
changes in wage inflation (or in the case of Portugal and the Netherlands price
inflation).
The model developed has, at its heart, a basic equation for explaining inflation in the
different countries, with inflation being a function of the unemployment gap and a
distributed lag of past inflation. With regard to the unemployment gap term, which
could be seen as a rough indicator of real wage flexibility in the respective countries,
the NAIRU part of the gap is determined by a series of structural variables such as tax
pressure, borrowing costs and trend productivity growth. By adopting this modelling
strategy the paper can provide meaningful, short-run, NAIRU / NAWRU estimates
which encompass not only the latter's longer run structural determinants but which34
also mirror the dynamic adjustment of the economy to past economic shocks, as
reflected in the impact of the unemployment gap on wage or price inflation16.
The most important point to retain from the analysis undertaken is that, in all of the
Member States for which NAWRU / NAIRU's are estimated, the unemployment gap
term would appear to be important in explaining past changes in either wage or price
inflation, with effects of between 0.5 and 1 being registered in most cases i.e. a 1%
point change in the unemployment gap term leads to a 0.5 to 1 % point change in
inflation in a majority of the Member States. This can be seen graphically in Section
3 of the paper, where the estimated unemployment gaps are shown to be remarkably
good, in most cases, at explaining past inflationary developments, at least in relation
to wage trends. In addition, the unemployment gap term is also broadly stationary for
all countries which suggests that the specification used in the paper for the various
Member States seems sufficient to capture the trend in unemployment in those
countries.
The study also assesses the gains to be made from estimating NAIRU / NAWRU's
using an economic approach, such as that used in the present paper, as opposed to
simply using a statistical method such as the H-P filter to extract the trend
unemployment rate. The results of the comparison of the economically estimated
unemployment gaps with the H-P filtered generated gaps is in fact very encouraging
for the methodology adopted in the paper, since it indicates that for each Member
State there is a gain to be made by estimating an economically significant NAIRU
series, with the gain in certain countries being very significant in terms of both the
explanatory power of the NAIRU's and in terms of the significance of the relationship
between the unemployment gaps and past changes in wage inflation. Furthermore,
the paper suggests that the link between unemployment gaps and wage inflation is, in
general, substantially stronger than between output gaps and general price inflation.
As regards the specific determinants of the NAIRU estimates, it is interesting to note
in relation to the taxation effects that there are similarities between the results of the
present study with those of an earlier study in this area by Daveri and Tabellini in
1997. As shown in Section 2 of the paper, the largest employment effect of taxes, as
in the case of the Daveri and Tabellini study, are found in those continental European
countries, such as Germany, Spain and France, where unions play a big role in a
decentralised wage bargaining system. In the latter countries the present study
suggests that a 1% point increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in the equilibrium
unemployment rate of half a point. An important role is also found in the present
study for the real interest rate variable in a number of the Community's countries and
a tentative explanation is given as to why this might be so. This explanation
highlights the difficulty in isolating the demand from the supply side effects of real
interest rate changes, especially here in Europe since the unemployment cycle appears
to have stretched out over the last number of decades. It is impossible to definitively
16 See section 1.4 for a further discussion on the distinction between the short and long run NAIRU
concepts.35
say whether this lengthening is due to a deterioration in the supply side fundamentals
or whether it reflects slow adjustment / persistence effects.
In overall terms, while the equation specifications used in the paper for some of the
Member States may appear rather sparse it should be borne in mind, as highlighted in
a lot of research in this area in the past, that whilst data may exist for a large range of
possible explanatory factors for changes in structural unemployment, such as the
benefit replacement ratio, the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage, the
degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process, the amount of expenditure on
active labour market policies, real interest rates, the tax wedge, union density and
employment protection legislation, many of the effects of the latter set of variables are
highly correlated. This multicollinearity problem ensures that even if all these
variables were included in our equation specification it would still remain very
difficult to definitively establish the relative quantitative contribution of each factor to
changes in structural unemployment over time. The final specification chosen for
each country should therefore be seen as a type of summary reflection of a much more
complex set of factors, with the small number of final variables chosen clearly
encapsulating the effects of a much wider, related, range of influences.
With regard to the policy implications of the analysis undertaken in this paper, the
first point to note is that the NAIRU estimates produced tentatively support the
hypothesis of a non-vertical short-run Phillips curve, with quantifiable feedback
effects being identified from deviations in the actual unemployment rate from the
natural rate to changes in the rate of wage/price inflation. While, of course, empirical
support may exist for such a short-run trade-off, it would be fundamentally wrong to
infer from this evidence that such a trade-off could be exploited for policy purposes.
This is especially true here in Europe given the previously mentioned instabilities in
the Phillips curve for the majority of the Community countries. In fact, given all the
empirical and theoretical difficulties associated with the NAIRU concept, the
individual point estimates produced in this paper for the various countries are likely,
not surprisingly, to evoke a strong sense of dubiousness on the part of many national
policy makers.
At a wider level, there would appear to be a growing sense of unease in a number of
European countries, openly articulated in the vast literature on this topic, concerning
both the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the NAIRU concept, with this
unease suggesting caution in attributing any policy role at all to the concept. In this
regard it should be remembered that in addition to the practical measurement
problems already alluded to, at a fundamental level the theoretical weaknesses, in
particular hysteresis mechanisms, call into question even the existence of a unique
long run NAIRU, i.e. it may be indeterminate or stochastic by nature. However, while
the present authors share a lot of the latter concerns and feel that these problems
render short-run NAIRU estimates, like the ones calculated in this paper, less than
useful in the macro policy context, it is nevertheless felt that a case can still be made
for sustaining the use of these estimates as a structural indicator for cross country,
labour flexibility, comparisons. Regarding the latter, it is postulated that short-run
NAIRU's contain useful information for structural policy and that calculating this36
concept as an ex-post indicator of structural problems still remains its most important
potential contribution to the policy debate.
Finally, in terms of future research, it is clear that a more disaggregated analysis is
needed if one wishes to use these NAIRU estimates in any meaningful way in the
structural policy making process in the various countries. In this regard, in most
Member States, it is widely accepted that the fundamental problem regarding
structural unemployment lies at the low end of the skill distribution. Action to
address this problem is manifestly needed to enhance the employability of the
unskilled and the inexperienced through active labour market measures whilst at the
same time increasing the employment prospects of this group of workers through such
measures as targetted reductions in employers social charges, appropriate action in
terms of statutory wage floors and overhauling the system of social assistance to
ensure that it is not acting to undermine incentives to work. Policy actions along the
latter lines have already been introduced in a large number of Member States. In this
regard it is clear that our present specification is not detailed enough to pick up the
effects of such changes, including for example the introduction of important
modifications to the tax regime for the low skilled, since the necessary, cross-country,
data to include a meaningful skilled / unskilled breakdown is difficult to assemble.
This is something which must urgently be addressed in any future research work in
this area.37
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